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I. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

The Federal Circuit is a specialized court with generalist aspirations.
Congress created the Federal Circuit Court from the ashes of the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, giving the court
appellate jurisdiction over the subject matter of its predecessor courts.1
Pursuant to statute, the Federal Circuit hears appeals from Article I courts,
such as the International Trade Commission, the Patent Trial and Appeals
Board, the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, the Merit Service
Protection Board, and others. 2 District court decisions involving patent
law are appealed to the Federal Circuit, whose precedents are binding
nationally. 3 Although the Federal Circuit is an intermediate appellate
* Dr. Shubha Ghosh is the Crandall Melvin Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property
Commercialization and Innovation Law Curricular Program and the Syracuse Intellectual Property
Law Institute at the Syracuse University College of Law. His research focuses on the development
and commercialization of intellectual property and technology as a means of promoting economic
and social development.
1. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Under 1295(A)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 651 (2002); See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5)–(14) (2012).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
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court with final jurisdiction with the Supreme Court, given the volume of
patent appeals and the limited grant of certiorari by the high court, the
Federal Circuit is effectively the “Supreme Court of Patent Law.” 4
Even with such detailed and limited domain, the Federal Circuit
portrays itself as a generalist court. At a March 2018 meeting of the
Federal Judicial Conference, a number of Federal Circuit judges referred
to themselves and their colleagues as generalist judges during a plenary
panel of almost all the judges on the Federal Circuit. There was no dissent
from this characterization. One avenue through which the Federal Circuit
has asserted its generalist inclinations is the statutory provision granting
the court subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under any act of
Congress relating to patent or plant variety protection. This language has
justified Federal Circuit jurisdiction over matters of copyright law,
trademark law, and state patent law. This expansion of jurisdiction is
troubling because it allows the Federal Circuit to create precedent that is
outside its scope of specialization. This article makes the case for stripping
the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit either through amendment of the
statute or through judicial interpretation of the existing statute in a manner
that confers jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction stripping is a controversial topic both politically and
jurisprudentially. 5 The controversies have arisen in politically-charged
areas such as abortion rights, school integration, and access to the courts. 6
To raise the issue in the context of patent law may seem disproportionate
to the broader question of separation of legislative and judicial powers.
But jurisdiction stripping of the Federal Circuit has happened. The
Supreme Court limited the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over state law

4. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 387, 387 (2001).
5. David Cole states as follows:
It is easy to see why scholars have found the issue such a rich one. It presents in stark relief
the fundamental paradox of a constitutional democracy: how to reconcile the
antidemocratic character of a Constitution with democratic principles. Congressional
control over federal jurisdiction is often justified as one of the ways this reconciliation is
effected.
David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process As Limits on Congress’s
Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2481 (1998).
6. See, e.g., John Roberts, Memorandum, Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate
Jurisdiction: An Analysis in Light of Recent Developments in CORRESPONDENCE FILES OF KEN
STARR, 1981–1983, 66–92, https://www.archives.gov/files/news/john-roberts/accession-60-880498/014-supreme-court-jurisdiction/folder014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W77P-DTTJ]
(detailing
congressional attempts to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in matters of abortion, school
bussing, discrimination, and more).
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claims in its 2013 Gunn v. Minton decision 7 and over patent counterclaims
to antitrust claims in its 2005 Holmes v. Vornado decision. 8 Congress
overturned the latter decision through the America Invents Act of 2011. 9
Federal Circuit jurisdiction is an active topic and not merely a technical
one. The concern remains that when the Federal Circuit decides cases
outside of its subject matter expertise, it is shaping areas of law in ways
inconsistent with Congress’s intent and potentially creating conflicts with
other circuits that have jurisdiction over copyright, contract, and
trademark questions.
Arising under jurisdiction is justified in terms of efficiency of
adjudication. If a district court dispute involves patent claims and
counterclaims, as well as copyright, trademark, or state law contract
claims relating to the patents, then there is logic to having the Federal
Circuit hear any appellate issues pertaining to the patent claims and
related non-patent claims. The problem, however, is identifying which
law the Federal Circuit should apply to the non-patent claims. Supreme
Court precedent in the pertinent areas clearly binds the Federal Circuit.
But in areas where there is no precedent, the court has to look at other
areas of law.
For trademark claims, the Federal Circuit might look to its own
precedent reviewing Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) decisions,
one statutory area of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 10 But for
questions of trademark infringement, an area outside the scope of the
PTAB’s purview over registration, the Federal Circuit needs to identify
the pertinent body of law on which to base its decision. 11 A similar
question arises for copyright and state contract law decisions. With
respect to trademark infringement and copyright questions, the Federal
Circuit has ruled that it must look to the precedent of the circuit from
which the appeal arose. 12 But this sister circuit precedent is now filtered
through the interpretative lens of Federal Circuit judges. With respect to
contract law, the Federal Circuit seems to revert to general principles of
law, creating what I have called a federal common law of contracts,

7. See Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass,
81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1996) (analyzing Federal Circuit’s choice of law in reviewing state
court questions); See also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1791 (2013).
8. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013).
9. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
10. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
12. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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binding future cases arising from the intersection of patent and contract
claims. 13
Unintentionally, a justification based in efficiency of adjudication
leads to inefficient, nonuniform, and questionable results. Federal Circuit
decisions on copyright and trademark laws, fields outside the court’s
expertise, often add to the confusion rather than providing needed clarity.
For example, in its decision in Oracle v. Google, the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of infringement of copyrighted software. 14 Its decision
for the copyright owner complicated the issues of copyright ownership,
fair use, and the roles of the judge and jury in determining questions of
fact and law in the adjudication of copyright questions. While the Federal
Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from denial of trademark registration,
the judges arguably went outside their fields of expertise in addressing
questions of trademark protection for colors, 15 the meaning of geographic
misdescriptive marks, 16 and First Amendment protection for disparaging
and scandalous speech. 17 These ventures into areas that are outside the
court’s original subject matter expertise do not further the goals of
efficiency, whether gauged in terms of the costs of adjudication or
uniformity. Instead, the ventures represent a specialized court trying to fly
on generalist wings.
Previous scholarship mapped the confusion cast on state contract law
by application of the Federal Circuit’s arising under jurisdiction. 18
Whether determining the priority of assignments, interpreting licenses,
identifying sales, or assessing settlements, the Federal Circuit has
expanded its jurisdiction to create a federal common law of contract.19
This article continues that argument but addresses the case for stripping
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over contract law claims. The argument
for jurisdiction stripping presented here in the context of contract law is
intended to be paradigmatic for other areas such as copyright and
trademark. While it is understandable that Federal Circuit judges do not
want to be pigeonholed as lesser than their generalist colleagues on other
intermediate federal appellate courts, the legal reality is that Congress
13. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
15. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (allowing
registration of color pink).
16. In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (introducing materiality
standard into determination of geographic misdescriptive marks).
17. See Shubha Ghosh, Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal Circuit’s Contract Law
Jurisprudence and IP Federalism, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 536 (2014).
18. See Schaffner, supra note 7 at 1176–77.
19. California Innovations, 329 F. 3d. 1334.
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created the Federal Circuit for a purpose. Jurisdiction stripping can return
the court to its original design with the goal of curing some of the
confusing judgments that can arise once the court strays.
The case for jurisdiction stripping is set forth in the following
sections. Section two summarizes the existing argument that the Federal
Circuit has created a federal common law of contract. Section three makes
the case for jurisdiction stripping based on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Gunn v. Minton, a decision denying Federal Circuit jurisdiction to state
legal ethics claims. Section four broadens the argument to address
concerns about separation of powers and access to the courts.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND STATE CONTRACT LAW 20
Simultaneous patent assignments are a common problem that the
United States Supreme Court reviewed in 2011 in Stanford v. Roche. 21
The controversy at the heart of this decision illustrates the federalism
issues the Federal Circuit’s contract law jurisprudence raises. At issue in
Roche was research pertaining to AIDS therapies, specifically, the
ownership of three biomedical patents obtained by Stanford on HIV
quantification techniques. Although the narrow focus of the case is in the
field of biotechnology, it has implications for any scientific research area.
The common practice at issue is an inventor’s signing of multiple
assignments to various entities with which the inventor works. The Roche
litigation raises the key practical problem of how to reconcile these
conflicting legal obligations.
Dr. Holodniy was a scientist working for Stanford University in the
field of HIV and AIDS research. As part of his employment with Stanford,
he signed a standard employment contract under which he “agreed to
assign” all interests in any inventions that came out of his work to
Stanford. 22 Holodniy’s research required him to work with Cetus to learn
the company’s technique of polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which is
used to make copies of DNA sequences. Holodniy, while still employed
by Stanford, visited Cetus to undertake training. As a visitor, he was
required to sign a confidentially agreement, which stated that Holodniy
agreed to and “do[es] hereby assign” all interests in inventions that arose

20. Pages 7–28 are taken from my article, Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal
Circuit’s Contract Law Jurisprudence and IP Federalism, published in the Journal of the Patent and
Trademark Office Society. I thank them for their publication and work.
21. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S.
776 (2011).
22. Id. at 780.
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from his work at Cetus. 23 Due to Holodniy’s work at Stanford, the
university received three patents in the field of HIV counting. These
patents were the basis for the lawsuit.
Roche acquired Cetus and all of its assets, including legal interests
in inventions that arose from contract. 24 Roche practiced the inventions
covered by Stanford’s patents, and Stanford sued for patent infringement.
One of Roche’s defenses to patent infringement was that Stanford did not
own the patents and therefore could not sue for infringement. The district
court disagreed and found that Stanford was the owner of the patents.
Under the terms of the assignment, Stanford had an interest in Holodniy’s
inventions created after the date of the assignment. Stanford’s interest
trumped those of Roche because Holodniy, at the time he signed the
agreement with Cetus, had already assigned his legal rights to the
invention to Stanford and, consequently, had nothing to convey.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Bayh-Dole Act 25 did not
grant Stanford any rights to Holodniy’s inventions. Instead, Stanford’s
rights were based solely on the assignments (contracts) between Stanford
and its employee. Parsing the language of the assignments, the court ruled
that Stanford had no right in Holodniy’s invention since Holodniy simply
agreed to assign his rights at some future time. 26 By contrast, Holodniy’s
agreement with Cetus did transfer rights to Cetus. In the confidentiality
agreement with Cetus, Holodniy assigned his rights to all future
inventions to Cetus. This language implied a present transfer of rights as
opposed to an intention to assign rights in the future. Consequently, Cetus
had the rights to Holodniy’s inventions, not Stanford. Therefore, Roche
had ownership of the patented inventions. Stanford had no rights in the
patents and could not sue for patent infringement.
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Roche was greeted with much
consternation. 27 Many universities had language similar to Stanford’s in
employment agreements. These agreements, as written, could be readily
trumped by another agreement that more clearly used words like hereby.
Consequently, the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari was a
23. Id. at 781 (alteration in original).
24. Id.
25. The Bayh-Dole Act addresses intellectual property created using federal funds. Patent and
Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015.
26. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
27. See Ted Hagelin, The Unintended Consequences of Stanford v. Roche, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 335,
336 (2011); Robert M. Yeh, The Public Paid for the Invention: Who Owns It?, 27 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 453 (2012).
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hopeful sign. Not only would the Court’s final ruling be its first on the
Bayh-Dole Act, but it would overrule what many saw as the Federal
Circuit’s strained reading of contractual language.
With so much at stake and such well-heeled actors involved, it was
perhaps inevitable that the Supreme Court would review the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Roche. Although the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have come to opposite conclusions on patent law matters on many
other occasions, 28 they agreed in Roche. 29 The Bayh-Dole Act, as the
Federal Circuit concluded, does not create patent rights in universities.30
Patent rights are a matter of assignment and other contracts. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Circuit regarding
the respective assignments.
Justice Sotomayor in a concurring opinion, stated that the Court
should reconsider the Federal Circuit’s case law on patent assignments. 31
As a procedural matter, however, the issue was not presently before the
Court. Justice Sotomayor left the matter for another case. Justice Breyer,
however, was not so reluctant. His view and that of Justice Ginsburg, who
signed onto his dissent, was that the Court was in a position to reassess
the Federal Circuit’s case law on patent assignments. The dissenting
justices declared this case law erroneous and stated their opinion that
Stanford should have prevailed. 32 The dissenting justices set the stage for
future legal disputes.
The Federal Circuit based its ruling on the conflicting assignment
issue in Roche on its 1991 precedent, Filmtec v. Alled Signal. 33 Justice
Breyer questions this decision because of inconsistency with prior law.
The Federal Circuit ruled in Filmtec that priority of assignment depends
upon whether an assignment is a present transfer of a future interest or an
28. See Ghosh, supra note 17; see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (stating, “[A]
decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both
specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced,
adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent laws . . . embod[y].’” (alterations in
original) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989))); see
also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating, “[O]ccasional decisions [on issues of
patent law] by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized
court may develop an institutional bias.”). As cited in Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit
Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1505 (2012).
29. See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563
U.S. 776 (2011) (affirming Federal Circuit).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 794.
32. Id. at 798–801
33. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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intention to transfer a future interest in the future. The future interest at
issue is the patent, which did not exist when the employee entered into the
respective contracts. The assignment provisions were a promise to assign
the patent rights when they arose. If, however, the assignment provision
was a present transfer, as use of the word hereby would demonstrate, then
the transfer to the employer is automatic, occurring as soon as the future
patent rights come into being. In Roche, the Federal Circuit concluded that
all Stanford had was its employee’s promise to transfer future patent rights
sometime in the future. 34 In contrast, Cetus received a present transfer of
future patent rights which would come into effect when the patent was
granted. Therefore, according to the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, Cetus
and its successor, Roche, owned the patent rights.
Justice Breyer finds several flaws with the Federal Circuit’s
reasoning. First, it rests too simplistically on formal language that creates
a trap for the unwary. 35 The Federal Circuit’s announced rule is
unpredictable and burdens every entity that thought it had the right
language in its employment contracts, only to be told it did not.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is inconsistent with prior
law, based in part on state law, that the first assignment (from Holodniy
to Stanford) would create an equitable interest that would have to be
weighed against any subsequent assignments. Stanford, as the first
assignee in time, should win according to this view of patent assignments.
The Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning of the Federal Circuit,
has instituted a new rule with respect to conflicting patent assignments:
Present assignments trump future assignments, even if the present
assignment is entered into after the future assignment. Justice Breyer finds
this rule problematic for the reasons explained above.
When contract issues intersect with patent law in areas such as
licensing and assignments, the on-sale bar, the first-sale doctrine, and
settlement agreements, the Federal Circuit has exercised its jurisdiction
over patent claims to create a body of contract doctrine that is divorced
from state law or any broader contract policy. Instead, the Federal Circuit
has emphasized the value of uniformity in patent law to address contract
disputes within the largely groundless realm of the court’s own common
law.
The Federal Circuit’s common law of contract has been far from
homogeneous. In the area of settlement agreements, for example, the
Federal Circuit defers to the law of the regional circuit from which the

34.
35.

Roche, 563 U.S at 784.
Id. at 799–800.
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dispute arose to interpret the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, in areas
where the Federal Circuit creates its own law, such as the first-sale
doctrine, patent policies inform the court, consistent with the basis for its
specialized jurisdiction in patent law (although almost certainly
inconsistent with other federal laws, such as antitrust law). In the areas of
licensing, assignments, and the on-sale bar, however, the court creates
contract rules that do not depend on patent expertise, but instead focus on
typical transactions among private parties involving the sale or transfer of
an asset. Uniformity in these last two types of patent cases seems
overstated as a goal since patent law is arguably not even implicated.
While the Federal Circuit’s approach to contract law is nominally based
on the goal of uniformity, the federal common law it has created is neither
internally consistent nor consistent with the court’s patent expertise.
Perhaps there is no simple explanation for the origin of the Federal
Circuit’s contract jurisprudence. One theory is that the court has expanded
its jurisdictional reach by aggrandizing contract law. 36 This hypothesis
does not seem consistent with the differences among the judges on the
role of state contract law in the court’s jurisdiction. Arguably, the court
has not expanded its jurisdiction in other areas of state law such as tort
law or remedies, which come before the court attendant to patent claims. 37
A stronger theory may lie in how the court views the
commercialization of patented inventions. On one hand, the goal of
uniformity may be seen as promoting the goals of the patent owner to
monetize and commercialize inventions through the system of contract
law whether in the form of licenses, assignments, or conditioned sales.
Within the scheme of commercialization, the need for uniform rules to
guide transactions may serve as a means of maximizing value through
minimizing the cost of complex and disparate rules. Such an explanation
is consistent with the court’s treatment of settlement agreements, which
are outside the purview of the federal common law of contracts previously
identified. Settlement agreements arguably do not arise in a transactional
setting. Instead, they serve to resolve litigation that is within the
jurisdiction of the relevant district court. The Federal Circuit’s deference
to the interpretative rules of the regional circuit is not a deference to
private orderings, but to the findings of the district court that must approve
the settlements. Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s approach to settlement
agreements does not ostensibly maximize transaction value by creating a

36. Ghosh, supra note 17.
37. See, e.g., Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 855 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (analyzing and
applying state law of unjust enrichment).
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uniform federal law of contract. The goal is to lower the costs of settling
litigation by deference to local rules. Such cost reduction may indirectly
have an effect on transaction value maximization, although through a
mechanism different from the creation of a uniform federal law of
contract.
Whatever the positive analysis for the Federal Circuit’s creation of a
federal common law of contract, the more challenging question is the
normative desirability of such a body of law. That question is the primary
focus of this section, and the answer rests on an understanding of the
intersection of patent law, contract law, and technology policy, with goals
of promoting progress through invention and commercialization. Explicit
in this intersection is the role of a specialized federal court whose
jurisdiction is patent law.
Arguably, the problem informing this article may vanish if we
remove the Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction. Absent such
jurisdiction, a court would view the problem of state law as an Erie
problem 38 and would adopt a deference to state law on the underlying
contract law. A specialized court, however, might view the matter as one
arising from patent law and resolve the contract law matter as one of its
specialized body of law. The Federal Circuit has adopted the latter
approach precisely. The court’s adoption of this approach, however, is not
inevitable and is inconsistent with federalism both in terms of the structure
of the United States court system and intellectual property laws.
The Federal Circuit addressed its own role in the federal court system
in Atari v. JS & A Group. 39 At issue in this decision was the role of
deference to regional circuits, a point discussed above in the context of
settlement agreements. The Federal Circuit identified several policies that
would justify exercising jurisdiction over a federal question related to
patent law. Uniformity was one of these policies, but the court also
recognized the policies of preventing forum shopping, avoiding bifurcated
appeals, and avoiding self-appropriation. The court concluded that it
could hear the related federal question but should defer to the decisions of
the relevant regional circuit. 40

38. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). For recent scholarly analysis of Erie,
see Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1558 (2011)
(describing areas of specialized federal common law); Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of
Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755 (2013)
(contending that federal courts engage in “under-the-radar” efforts to fashion federal common law).
39. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
40. Id.
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The Federal Circuit, erroneously, has not taken this position with
respect to state contract law. Instead, the court has emphasized the policy
of uniformity while ignoring the other three policies that defer to state
law. In effect, the court has ignored the Erie doctrine. Under the Supreme
Court’s 1937 decision in Erie v. Tompkins, 41 a federal court ruling on a
matter of state law under its diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of
the state from which the dispute arose. Which state law to apply is a matter
of choice of law principles. What the federal court cannot do, however, is
create its own federal common law in lieu of the state statutory or common
law. 42 As the Court affirmed in Butner v. United States, 43 the Erie doctrine
applies to a court’s supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
attendant to a federal question. The Federal Circuit reveals a fundamental
error in its understanding of the federal court system by creating its own
federal common law of contracts.
A federal court making such a fundamental error seems
unfathomable. The Federal Circuit characterizes the contract law
questions it confronts as matters of patent law. An agreement involving a
patent, whether a license, a sale, or an assignment, entails questions of
patent law rather than contract law, according to the Federal Circuit. 44
Similarly, the question of whether a patent is on sale, as the Supreme
Court defined in Pfaff, 45 is a matter of patent law rather than contract law.
While the Federal Circuit’s conceptualization can explain why the court
has created its own federal law of contract, this explanation cannot justify
what is a fundamental error. Furthermore, this transformation of state

41. Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
42. The general rule, stated in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) is “[t]here is
no federal general common law.” However, in the area of patent law, as in the area of antitrust,
“the [Erie] doctrine . . . is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the
policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which
they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes,
rather than by local law.”
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 174 (1942) (holding that a patent licensee could
raise a Sherman Act claim against patent owner despite any state rules of estoppel against licensee).
The Patent Act, however, does not contain specific rules relating to interpretations of agreements
pertaining to patents. Therefore, deference to state contract law would be appropriate.
43. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979). A possible defense of the Federal Circuit’s
federal common law of contract may lie in the Supreme Court’s decision in Clearfield Tr. Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding that federal law would apply in disputes involving federal
government property). If patents are viewed as a form of federal government property (such as the
commercial paper at issue in Clearfield Trust), then there is a case for a federal common law
pertaining to contracts involving property. But a patent is arguably a federally recognized interest
vested in a private party. Therefore, the rule of Clearfield Trust would not apply.
44. Atari, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1422.
45. Pfaff v. Wells Elec’s., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
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contract law issues into patent law issues conflicts with the established
case law on patent preemption. Consequently, the Federal Circuit
compounds its error on the structure of federal courts with an error
regarding the relative supremacy of patent law and contract law.
In its Aronson decision, 46 the Supreme Court held that patent law
does not preempt enforcement of a contract governing an unpatentable
invention. At issue in Aronson was an agreement between an inventor and
a company that agreed to manufacture and distribute a keychain. Under
the terms of the agreement, the company agreed to pay a royalty fee based
on its sales of the keychain, which the inventor sought to patent. If the
patent was granted, the royalty fee would increase. The patent was denied.
The company refused to manufacture and sell the keychain because it was
unpatented and thus competitors could readily copy it. The company’s
rationale was that a contract on an unpatentable item would undermine the
federal patent system. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that
contracts supplemented the commercialization goals of the patent system
and the specific escalator clause was consistent with the incentives to
obtain a patent. 47 The company benefitted from being an early seller of
the product and assumed the risk that the product would not be patentable.
The Aronson decision should not be read as holding that patent law
will preempt any contract term. In a prior case, for example, the Court
held that a contract term requiring payment on a patented invention for a
period longer than the term of the patent conflicted with patent law. 48 In a
subsequent case, the Court held that a contract term prohibiting a patent
licensee from challenging the validity of the patent was invalid. 49 There
is no claim that contracts provide a sanctuary from patent law. Instead, the
Aronson Court emphasized the ways in which contract law can
supplement patents. Implicit in this view of preemption is the independent
role of contract law within the federal system of patent law. The Federal
Circuit ignores this independence by turning contract law questions into
matters of patent law. In effect, the Federal Circuit ignores the Supreme
Court’s established precedent on the federalist system of intellectual
property. Contract law complements federal intellectual property law in
the promotion of invention and innovation. That lesson summarizes the
analysis of the previous subsection.
The detailed discussion of the Federal Circuit’s contract law
jurisprudence reveals two errors the Aronson Court made, one relating to
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
Id. at 263.
See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 659 (1969).
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the relationship between federal and state courts and one relating to the
place of contract law in the scheme of federal intellectual property. The
rest of this section turns to correct these two errors. The solution relies on
state contract law and a rejection of the federal common law of contract.
Buttressing this solution are the policies underlying contract law as a
policy lever for innovation working in tandem with federal intellectual
property law. This will be the subject of the next two subsections. The
challenge is identifying mechanisms for reforming the Federal Circuit’s
contract law jurisprudence. How does one overrule the body of cases
identified in this article? The last two subsections address these legal
reform issues by first turning to a reaffirmation of the Supreme Court’s
preemption jurisprudence and its proper balance between contract and
patent law. The section concludes with a discussion of statutory and
judicial reforms which the federalist principles of patent law set forth by
the Supreme Court informed.
Patent law does not resolve a market failure resulting from the
inadequacies of contract law, but instead serves as a body of law that
supplements contract law in guiding inventors through the creation and
marketing of new products. Together, the two bodies of law serve as a
broad system of rules to meet the constitutional goal of promoting
progress. 50 Supreme Court decisions such as Aronson, finding patent law
did not preempt some contract terms, are consistent with this
understanding. These decisions are the foundation for the federalist
conception of intellectual property law.
Nonetheless, the argument arises for the supremacy of patent law
over contract law even within this federalist framework. The Federal
Circuit’s contract decisions presented in sections two and three illustrate
this supremacy argument. Ultimately, a full assessment of this argument
would lead to its rejection. This subsection presents the pros and cons of
the supremacy argument, concluding that the Federal Circuit has taken the
wrong path in constructing its own contract law.
What stands out in the Federal Circuit contract opinions is the value
of uniformity in patent law decisions. While uniformity is an important
role of federal law, certainly it is not the only goal. Uniformity serves the
goals of clarity and predictability at the expense of allowing for
experimentation and development in legal regimes. A uniformly bad rule
is nonetheless a bad rule, and one that may be difficult to alter. Uniformity
by itself cannot justify the supremacy of a federal rule over state law. At

50.
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best, it is an important consequence of supremacy rather than an
explanation.
Informing the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on uniformity is the basis
of the court’s jurisdiction in patent law. Implicit in the argument for
uniformity is the presumed need for a homogeneous and predictable body
of law to govern patents. Such predictability may foster creativity and
inventiveness by providing some degree of certainty in an otherwise
turbulent and changing economic environment. Having clear rules that do
not vary by state allows inventors to invest reliably in the process of
invention and commercialization without the vagaries of the law that may
deter research and business. Such a fiction of law and the process of
invention may, in fact, fuel the Federal Circuit’s construction of a uniform
body of contract law.
This second argument can be dubbed the patents are special
justification. In light of the range of legal doctrines involving patents, the
justification proves excessive. It ignores the ways in which patent law
itself is unpredictable and uncertain. 51 Patentable subject matter, 52
nonobviousness, 53 the treatment of prior art, 54 and the written description
requirement 55 are examples of the changing winds of patent law. Some of
the unpredictability may arise from industry-specific applications of
seemingly general patent rules to particular inventive contexts. Another
source of the unpredictability of patent law is the shifting view of judges
as they engage in disagreement within a specific court and across courts.
To a certain extent, such changes may be predictable, but the vagaries of
patent law belie the notion that the pronouncements of federal law
introduce a reign of calm and certainty.
Even more striking is the unpredictability introduced by federal
common law because of the vagueness of its source. Writ large, federal
common law is grounded in the reason of the judge, and some may believe
that since we all share in reason, different decision makers will come to

51. See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75
(2005).
52. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski
Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 1349 (2011).
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); See, e.g., Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How
the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 57 (2008).
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2012); See, e.g., Moshe Wilensky, The Past and Future of
Admitted Prior Art, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237 (2013).
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s
Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009).
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the same predictable result. 56 That theory is far from true. Needless to say,
all law involves a prediction of what a court might do. In that sense, all
law is ultimately unpredictable. But there are differences in degree and in
kind. State common law is grounded in case law and statute. An inventor
entering into a contract involving a patent might have greater certainty in
predicting how a particular contract will be enforced under the statutes
and case law of a particular state than in gleaning the thoughts of a federal
judge. An issue may arise as to which state law will apply, but the range
of possibilities might be quite narrow compared to the open field of a
judge’s reason applied to a particular contract. Whether or not patents are
special, there is no reason to think that federal courts provide more
predictability than state courts.
A more modest version of the “patents are special” argument is the
need for uniform contract rules to facilitate patent licensing and other
means of commercialization. This argument may help to understand why
the Federal Circuit has created its own law of contracts while refraining
from creating its own law of other state law areas, such as torts. But many
of the points discussed above regarding the predictability of patent law
hold a fortiori in rebutting this argument. While the Federal Circuit’s
contract jurisprudence creates a uniform body of law that transcends the
law of the 50 states, it is unclear where the source of this law is adding to
the unpredictability. Furthermore, at the outset, parties to a contract
involving a patent may not know where any future disputes will be
litigated. The venue may be one of the several state courts or a federal
court. The case may be litigated as a patent matter or it may not be. 57 If
not, the Federal Circuit will not be implicated. While the range of this
uncertainty may not be as broad as I depict, it is unclear whether a uniform
Federal Circuit law of contracts makes matters more predictable. Instead,
it may just add another contingency to the legal regime for which the
parties have to prepare.

56. To phrase it more elegantly:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
57. See 9 JOHN E. MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACT § 51.11 272-3 (2008) (describing security
interests under Article 9); See Lars S. Smith, General Intangible or Commercial Tort: Moral Rights
and State-Based Intellectual Property As Collateral Under U.C.C. Revised Article 9, 22 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 95, 99 (2005).
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Uniformity is an unsatisfactory foundation for the supremacy of
federal over state law with respect to contracts involving patents, even
when supplemented with arguments pertaining to patents and patent
licensing. A consideration of intellectual property regimes other than
patents demonstrates a more deferential approach to contract law. Neither
copyright cases nor trademark cases are subject to specialized appellate
jurisdiction. Instead, the appeal goes to the relevant circuit court of
appeals. In some situations, copyright and trademark claims that are
attendant to a patent claim may go to the Federal Circuit.58 When one
looks at copyright and trademark cases involving contract issues, most
often in the cases of licenses, sales, or assignments, federal courts do not
create their own specialized rules of contract law.59 Instead, they defer to
the contract law of the state in which the contract arose, 60 consistent with
the Erie 61 decision and its progeny. It is unclear why uniformity is any
less important as a policy in copyright and trademark law than in patent
law.
What may explain the differing treatment of contract issues in
copyright and trademark cases in federal court is the lack of a specialized
appellate court for these areas of law. There is not a sample of copyright
or trademark cases involving contracts before the Federal Circuit to test
the hypothesis of the court’s aggrandizement of contract law as compared
to other federal appellate courts. With respect to areas of federal law other
than patent law, the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the regional
circuit, including any state law issues that that circuit has decided. 62 This
asymmetric treatment of choice of law across intellectual property
regimes may explain why patent law has been the area in which the
Federal Circuit has chosen to develop its own specialized contract
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012) (Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (2012) (Federal Circuit jurisdiction over
appeals from district court in federal question matters such as copyright or trademark when a patent
claim or counterclaim has been raised).
59. Examples of this can be seen in Federal Circuit case law:
We refer to contractual terms that limit a license’s scope as “conditions,” the breach of
which constitute copyright infringement. Id. at 1120. We refer to all other license terms as
“covenants,” the breach of which is actionable only under contract law. Id. We distinguish
between conditions and covenants according to state contract law, to the extent consistent
with federal copyright law and policy. Foad Consulting Group v. Musil Govan Azzalino,
270 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2001).
As cited in MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010); Accord
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (treating the copyright license under rules of
conditions and covenants).
60. See Blizzard, 629 F.3d 928.
61. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
62. See, e.g., Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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jurisprudence. Once again, the assumption that patents or patent licenses
are special does not justify the creation of a federal common law
pertaining to contracts in those two areas.
Nor does the Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction over patents
justify a differential treatment of contracts in patents from other areas of
intellectual property. If uniformity is the goal, there is arguably a need for
uniformity across intellectual property regimes as well as within a regime.
But uniformity is seemingly a straw argument. More to the point,
specialized jurisdiction does not imply specialized law pertaining to
contracts involving patents. As a conceptual matter, jurisdiction of a court
says little about the source of law for deciding a particular case. A federal
court may look at federal law in some cases and state law in others.
Similarly, a state court might look to different sources of law based on the
particular case. Some judges on the Federal Circuit have made the
conscious decision to create a federal body of contract law as a
consequence of their exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent matters.
That decision does not follow logically from the court’s jurisdictional
grant or from patent law itself. Consistent with Erie and Supreme Court
precedent on intellectual property preemption, the Federal Circuit should
apply state law in contract cases involving patents. There is no directive
from Congress or from the Supreme Court that points to anything
different.
The jurisdiction argument leads to the final point of this subsection:
the implication of preemption doctrine for the Federal Circuit’s approach
to contract law. Arguably, without using the word preemption, the Federal
Circuit has created a supreme body of federal contract law that trumps
state contract law. Such action is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Aronson which held that federal intellectual property law, as a
general matter, did not preempt state contract law. 63 The next section
elaborates on this point with a thorough exegesis of Supreme Court
intellectual property preemption cases involving contracts as a step to
developing a solution to the jurisprudential dilemma the Federal Circuit
created.
III. JURISDICTION STRIPPING BY THE SUPREME COURT: GUNN V. MINTON
While the issue of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over contract
claims has eluded the Supreme Court, the Court’s analysis of its
jurisdiction over state attorney malpractice claims in Gunn v. Minton 64
63.
64.
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serves as a comparative model for arising under jurisdiction and state
claims more broadly. In Gunn, the Court rejected the argument that there
was exclusive federal jurisdiction over attorney malpractice claims when
the attorney in question is a patent attorney who allegedly mishandled a
patent law matter. The state court retained jurisdiction over the
malpractice claim, even if patent issues were superficially involved.
Implicitly, the Court rejected arguments for the need for uniformity in
limiting federal jurisdiction and looked instead to the substantive federal
claim within the state claim. The Court’s focus on substance in Gunn
provides a model for how courts can limit the expansion of arising under
jurisdiction to include state law contract claims. Combined with the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the well-pleaded complaint rule in Holmes v.
Vornado, 65 a case concerning Federal Circuit jurisdiction over patent
counterclaims, the Court’s methodology in Gunn implies that stripping
Federal Circuit jurisdiction over state contract claims is a possibility.
Patent owner Minton asserted a patent infringement claim which laid
the path to the Supreme Court. Minton lost his patent infringement claim
in federal district court in Texas. The court concluded that his patent was
invalid under the on-sale bar. Subsequently, Minton brought an attorney
malpractice suit in state court, alleging his attorneys failed to raise the
defense that the alleged sale was an experimental use, which would have
supported the validity of the patent. Minton’s attorneys successfully
argued that their client would have lost the infringement suit even if the
experimental use defense had been raised. In his appeal of the trial court’s
ruling, Minton challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction. He argued that the
malpractice claim raised a substantive patent law issue over which the
federal court had exclusive jurisdiction. Minton’s argument was referred
to the Texas Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor. 66 Minton’s
attorneys, with Gunn as the principal named petitioner, successfully
obtained review of the Texas Supreme Court ruling from the United States
Supreme Court, which ruled against Minton. The state court had proper
jurisdiction, and the malpractice claim did not arise under patent law.
Arising under jurisdiction is determined through the four-part test set
forth in Grable v. Darue. 67 Under Grable and as the Supreme Court
summarized in Gunn,
federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1)
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable

65.
66.
67.

Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 251 (2013)
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g and Mfg., 545 U.S. 1158 (2005).
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of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance
approved by Congress. Where all four of these requirements are met, we
held, jurisdiction is proper because there is a “serious federal interest in
claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum,”
which can be vindicated without disrupting Congress’s intended
division of labor between state and federal courts. 68

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Roberts concluded that the first
two factors are satisfied in Minton’s state law claim. In order to establish
malpractice, he must show that he would have been successful on his
patent infringement claim. Therefore, the federal patent law issue is
necessarily raised in the state claim. Furthermore, the federal issue is
actually disputed. Minton’s attorneys would argue that the patent
infringement claim would not be successful. Minton fails to establish
federal jurisdiction under the last two factors.
Justice Roberts rules that the patent law issue is not substantial for
several reasons. Contrary to the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court,
Justice Roberts points out:
it is not enough that the federal issue be significant to the particular
parties in the immediate suit; that will always be true when the state
claim “necessarily raise[s]” a disputed federal issue, as Grable
separately requires. The substantiality inquiry under Grable looks
instead to the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole. 69

In Minton’s case, the federal issue is backward looking, meaning that its
resolution would not affect the prospective validity of the patent, which is
invalid since the experimental-use defense was not raised in a timely
manner. The Gunn Court reasoned:
the question is posed in a merely hypothetical sense: If Minton’s lawyers
had raised a timely experimental-use argument, would the result in the
patent infringement proceeding have been different? No matter how the
state courts resolve that hypothetical “case within a case,” it will not
change the real-world result of the prior federal patent litigation.
Minton’s patent will remain invalid. 70

In other words, the federal question in Gunn is not substantial because its
resolution is relevant to Minton’s state law claim and does not alter his
patent rights.

68.
69.
70.
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Furthermore, Justice Roberts did not find that state jurisdiction
would undermine the goal of uniformity in federal law:
Nor will allowing state courts to resolve these cases undermine “the
development of a uniform body of [patent] law.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103
L.Ed.2d 118 (1989). Congress ensured such uniformity by vesting
exclusive jurisdiction over actual patent cases in the federal district
courts and exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1295(a)(1). In resolving the nonhypothetical patent
questions those cases present, the federal courts are of course not bound
by state court case-within-a-case patent rulings. In any event, the state
court case-within-a-case inquiry asks what would have happened in the
prior federal proceeding if a particular argument had been made. In
answering that question, state courts can be expected to hew closely to
the pertinent federal precedents. It is those precedents, after all, that
would have applied had the argument been made. 71

Federal law precedent binds state courts, yet any state court decisions to
the contrary do not upset federal precedents. The hierarchy of court
authorities logically prevents any harm to the uniformity of patent law.
There is little, if any, threat of state courts upsetting uniformity by
addressing novel questions of patent law. Should a new patent question
arise in state court, the dynamics of litigation and the supremacy of federal
law would resolve any problems errant state courts created. As Justice
Roberts described:
As for more novel questions of patent law that may arise for the first
time in a state court “case within a case,” they will at some point be
decided by a federal court in the context of an actual patent case, with
review in the Federal Circuit. If the question arises frequently, it will
soon be resolved within the federal system, laying to rest any contrary
state court precedent; if it does not arise frequently, it is unlikely to
implicate substantial federal interests. 72

Justice Roberts offers an analysis of uniformity that, as I elaborate below,
has implications for arising under jurisdiction over state contract law
claims.
Finally, the Gunn Court rejects Minton’s argument that “real-world
effects” and the need for federal experience make the patent question
substantial. Any state court rulings about Minton’s patents would not

71.
72.

Id. at 261–262. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 262.
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implicate the preclusive effect of res judicata on future patent disputes.
Justice Roberts writes:
The Patent and Trademark Office’s Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure provides that res judicata is a proper ground for rejecting a
patent “only when the earlier decision was a decision of the Board of
Appeals’ or certain federal reviewing courts, giving no indication that
state court decisions would have preclusive effect.” 73

Furthermore, the Court cannot “accept the suggestion that the federal
courts’ greater familiarity with patent law means that legal malpractice
cases like this one belong in federal court.” 74 As the Gunn Court
concludes, “the possibility that a state court will incorrectly resolve a state
claim is not, by itself, enough to trigger the federal courts’ exclusive
patent jurisdiction, even if the potential error finds its root in a
misunderstanding of patent law.” 75
With respect to the fourth Grable factor, which requires maintaining
the federal-state balance, the Court found that appropriate balance
between state and federal responsibilities weighs against federal
jurisdiction. 76 While there is no substantial federal interest in Minton’s
claim, the state does have a substantial interest in regulating the conduct
of attorneys within its borders. As the Court in Gunn concludes: “We have
no reason to suppose that Congress—in establishing exclusive federal
jurisdiction over patent cases—meant to bar from state courts state legal
malpractice claims simply because they require resolution of a
hypothetical patent issue.” 77
Several points from the Gunn decision are relevant to Federal Circuit
jurisdiction over state contract claims: (1) the Court’s characterization of
Minton’s claim as backward-looking; (2) the approach to a case within a
case; and (3) the Court’s assessment of uniformity as a basis for
jurisdiction. The third point connects to the Court’s analysis of arising
under jurisdiction in its 2005 Holmes decision 78, which addressed the
issue of Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals.
The argument can be made that the Court’s analysis in Gunn applies
to backward-looking federal questions. Although the Court does not
explain what backward-looking means, the context in which the term
appears suggests that the patent issue is backward-looking because the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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patent is invalid and a state court’s adjudication of Minton’s malpractice
claim would not alter Minton’s federal rights. State court review would
only focus on whether Minton’s attorneys were negligent in failing to
raise a defense. But a finding of negligence would entitle Minton to
remedies under state law since the underlying patent claim has been
resolved and cannot be revived. If it is correct that Gunn applies only to
backward-looking federal issues, then one may reason that state contract
law questions involving patents are subject to federal jurisdiction.
Consider the example of the on-sale bar: whether a transaction involves
an offer to sell or an actual sale may be a question of state law; resolution
of that question, however, would affect the rights of the patent owner since
a finding that the invention was on sale outside the safe-harbor period
would invalidate the patent. The question is not backward-looking. The
doctrine of exhaustion provides another example: A sale would exhaust
the patent owner’s distribution rights and the state issue regarding when a
transaction constitutes a sale would affect the patent rights of the patent
owner. The issue is not backward-looking but rather has prospective
effect.
But even if Gunn is read so narrowly, some state law contract issues
may be backward-looking. Such would be the case with resolving patent
ownership. State rules of assignment priority can affect the ownership of
a patent. While determining the owner of a patent may ostensibly affect
prospective rights, the state law question of priority relates back to the
moment the assignments were made. Therefore, the issue is backwardlooking and, under the narrow reading of Gunn, the subject of state court
jurisdiction rather than federal. At a minimum, the narrow reading of
Gunn would strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over some state claims
that implicate patents.
However, Gunn should not be read so narrowly. The Court’s analysis
extends to the substantiality of the federal question and the balance
between federal and state interests. The broader and more correct reading
of Gunn supports stripping the arising under jurisdiction for patent-based
contract claims beyond issues of assignment. As read correctly, the Gunn
decision speaks to the assessment of federal and state interests when there
is a “case within a case.”
Minton’s claim involved a federal question of patent infringement
embedded within a state law claim of attorney malpractice. 79 The Court
concluded that the patent issue was not substantial in this “case within a

79. Minton v. Gunn, 301 S.W.3d 702, 704 (Tex. App. 2009), order withdrawn (Oct. 18, 2013),
rev’d, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 251 (2013).
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case.” 80 Patent-related state contract claims are different, however. In
adjudication over the on-sale bar, priority of assignments, or the
exhaustion doctrine, the state law issue is embedded within the federal
patent question. The case within the case is inverted and, arguably, there
is a less compelling reason for federal jurisdiction over the state law issues
under the Grable factors. While there is a federal interest in resolution of
the patent claim, there is also a considerable state interest in uniform and
predictable contract law, much like the state’s interest in the regulation of
the legal profession, which the Court recognizes. 81 Furthermore, state
contract law claims are subject to a similar dynamic between state and
federal law that the Gunn Court describes. If a federal court decides the
state law issue, the resulting federal decision potentially provides a new
source of law in resolving future state claims—a source outside the state
legislative, executive, and judicial processes. A federal common law of
contract creates anti-democratic pressures that destabilize the
development of state law.
One may argue that any instability in state law should be balanced
against the uniformity required for federal law. This argument is slightly
different from the Court’s point about uniformity in Gunn, where state
review of patent law could counter federal court developments. As the
Gunn Court emphasized, any state court pronouncements have no
precedential or preclusive effect in federal court because federal courts
are supreme. 82 However, state law decisions may potentially upset patent
law doctrines such as the on-sale bar or exhaustion doctrine. If state laws
differ as to what constitutes a sale, patent law would become more
unpredictable because the force of federal law would depend on the home
state of the transaction. But uniformity in state contract law may rebut this
argument.
Furthermore, the need for uniformity in patent law may be
overstated. As Justice Scalia stated in the majority opinion in Holmes,
“Our task here is not to determine what would further Congress’s goal of
ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words of the
statute must fairly be understood to mean.” 83 In Holmes, the Court found
that the language of the Patent Act in 2002 granted Federal Circuit
jurisdiction over patent claims but not counterclaims. 84 Holmes brought a
declaratory judgment action in federal district court, seeking a declaration
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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that it had not infringed Vornado’s trade dress as the company alleged in
an International Trade Commission (ITC) proceeding. 85 Vornado
counterclaimed for patent infringement. Vornado lost on the trade dress
claims, and the district court dismissed the patent counterclaim. 86
Vornado appealed to the Federal Circuit, which vacated the district court
ruling. Holmes then appealed to the Supreme Court, which applied the
“well-pleaded complaint rule” and concluded that the Federal Circuit
lacked appellate jurisdiction since the dispute did not involve a patent
claim.
Effectively, the Court’s ruling in Holmes promoted lack of
uniformity in the adjudication of patent claims. Since Vornado filed the
original complaint in the District Court of Kansas, it should have appealed
the trade dress and patent issues to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit. Congress did address this anomaly in the America
Invents Act by extending Federal Circuit jurisdiction to claims and
counterclaims arising under patent law. 87 But the Holmes decision
demonstrates that courts need not defer to a policy of uniformity in
determining federal jurisdiction. Instead, a court should strongly consider
the language of the Patent Act and perhaps Congress’s intent in creating
a specialized court for patent law 88 (although Justice Scalia would not
accept a reading based on congressional intent).
Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor issued a joint concurrence favoring
a position that would have been more advantageous to Federal Circuit
jurisdiction, illustrating the many dimensions of the uniformity
arguments. The concurring justices emphasized Congress’s goal in
creating the Federal Circuit:
The sole question presented here concerns Congress’s allocation of
adjudicatory authority among the federal courts of appeals. At that
appellate level, Congress sought to eliminate forum shopping and to
advance uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal patent
law. 89

Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor would find Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over patent counterclaims if the district court had fully adjudicated them.
In Holmes, however, since the district court dismissed Vornado’s
85. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1141 (D.
Kan.), dismissed, 232 F.3d 911 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and vacated, 13 F. App’x 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
vacated, 535 U.S. 826 (2002)
86. Id.
87. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 331 (2011).
88. Holmes, 535 U.S. 826, 833 (2002).
89. Id. at 840.
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counterclaim without review, the concurring justices agreed with the
majority’s decision that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction. Rather, the
concurrence focused on the manner in which the counterclaims were
disposed of by the district court and the need to avoid forum shopping in
patent litigation. Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor offer a policy-oriented
analysis of jurisdiction—one that goes beyond the face of a well-pleaded
complaint.
What Gunn and Holmes teach us is this: jurisdiction stripping of the
Federal Circuit is possible. These cases also identify viable models of how
to limit the specialized court’s jurisdiction to patent claims. In Gunn,
jurisdiction over the attorney malpractice claim rests with the relevant
state court. In Holmes, appellate jurisdiction over patent counterclaims
lies with the relevant geographic circuit court. A practical inquiry is how
the federal courts should treat state contract claims that arise in
conjunction with patent questions. I argue that arising under jurisdiction
would not vest the matter in federal courts but rather would require
adjudication by state courts. The administration of this prescription may
be impractical. A federal court hearing a patent matter may refer any state
court issues to the appropriate state court. Alternatively, the federal court
can defer to the relevant state law as it would in a diversity action. The
least desirable method is allowing the federal court create its own
common law of contract solely to promote uniformity of patent law.
Issues of law and policy regarding jurisdiction stripping are even
more compelling than the practical issues of implementation. Should
federal jurisdiction over questions that arguably pertain to federal law be
restricted? Would such limitation be consistent with the Constitution and
the legislative intent of Congress? These issues, tacit in the present
argument, are the focus of the next section.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF JURISDICTION AND SUBSTANCE
Congress can limit the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit just as
readily as it created it. Under the America Invents Act of 2011, Congress
expanded arising under jurisdiction to include patent counterclaims in
addition to patent claims in response to the Court’s ruling in Holmes. 90
What Congress can expand, it can also contract. In response to the
concerns surrounding a federal common law of contracts set forth in this
article, Congress should strip the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction over
contract issues. Such a result would best accommodate state contract

90.
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doctrine within patent law. This section sets forth the ways in which
Congress can limit the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in light of Supreme
Court precedent and academic scholarship.
By stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction over patent-based
contract claims, Congress still permits judicial review. State courts will
hear the claim, and any federal questions can serve as the basis for federal
jurisdiction with ultimate review by the Supreme Court. For example, if
there is a conflict between state contract law and patent law, federal courts
can still address the conflict under Article VI of the Constitution. For these
reasons, jurisdiction stripping of the Federal Circuit would not create a
conflict with Article III of the Constitution by denying access to federal
courts on federal issues.
Contract law arises in the patent context in two ways. First, as a
stand-alone question, contract law issues present as disputes as to the
formation of an agreement, interpretation of contractual terms, breach of
contract, or priority of multiple overlapping agreements among different
parties. These stand-alone contract issues should fall within the
jurisdiction of state courts, and the Federal Circuit should defer to state
court rulings in resolving these questions. Second, state contract law
issues may be incorporated into federal doctrine, such as the on-sale bar.
In this second category of cases, contract law issues such as whether a
transaction is a sale or a license, whether an offer has been made, or
questions of contract formation are incorporated into the federal law. In
fact, federal law may set forth rules for how to address contract law issues
by statute or judge-made law. When confronted with these types of
contract law issues, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction but should look to
state law precedent for guidance in resolution of the case. In effect, what
seems to be a state law issue is a federal question. The federal doctrine
has adopted the language of state contract law in creating a nation-wide
standard for patent law.
An attendant issue is distinguishing the two types of cases. For
example, in patent exhaustion cases, limitations in the sale of a patented
product will raise questions as to when contract law applies and when
patent law applies. 91 In its recent Lexmark decision, the Supreme Court
91. The Supreme Court in Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc stated:
We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit LGE’s
other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and
we express no opinion on whether contract damages might be available even though
exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.,
157 U.S. 659, 666, 15 S. Ct. 738, 39 L. Ed. 848 (1895) (“Whether a patentee may protect
himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a
question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that
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rejected the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale doctrine. The Court ruled
that a sale would exhaust the patent owner’s distribution rights regardless
of whether there are conditions on the sale. 92 The question remains as to
how courts should remedy a purchaser or subsequent transferee’s breach
of the limitation. This example illustrates the first type of cases discussed
in the previous paragraph with respect to the issue of what constitutes a
sale.
I would suggest that this issue be resolved through state law as
opposed to a federal common law as it is currently. Congress could define
the term sale in the patent statute, which would convert a type-one case
into a type-two case. But Congress has not done so. Although the question
of what constitutes a sale is resolved, the issue of remedy remains. The
Federal Circuit has created confusing jurisprudence regarding treatment
of limitations in transfers of patents and patented products by treating
some limitations as a matter of patent law and some as a matter of contract
law. 93 Some scholars have tried to make sense of Federal Circuit case law
through the distinction between in personam and in rem rights, with the
former relegating the limitations to a matter of contract law.94 I cannot
resolve this problem here, but I have addressed it in other work. 95 For the
purposes of this article, I merely flag the issue and conclude that once
contract issues are identified, state law should apply.
Congress can address this problem of Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over state law issues through jurisdiction stripping. This action would
entail amendments to § 1295. Such amendments would be consistent with
Article III, which grants Congress the power to create federal courts along
certain parameters. Article III, Section I states, “The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 96
Section II defines this judicial power as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;. . . In all the other
such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent
meaning and effect of the patent laws”).
553 U.S. 617, 637 (2008).
92. Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
93. See Andrew C. Michaels, Patent Transfer and the Bundle of Rights, 83 BROOK. L. REV.
933, 937 (2018).
94. Id.
95. See SHUBHA GHOSH & IRENE CALBOLI, EXHAUSTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(2018).
96. U.S. Const. art. III.
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Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 97

Congress created the Federal Circuit as an inferior court that has the power
to decide patent cases. It is important to note that in creating the Federal
Circuit, Congress effectively stripped sister circuits of the power to hear
appellate cases involving patent law. 98 Congress can allocate appellate
jurisdiction as it sees fit without infringing upon other provisions of the
Constitution. 99 If Congress determines that some contract law issues are
not a question of federal law, then the Federal Circuit can be stripped of
its jurisdiction to hear such cases. Contract law issues can still be heard in
state courts or in federal courts pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. In either
case, however, the contract issue must be resolved under state law.
One criticism of this approach is that litigants might lose the
opportunity for Supreme Court review. But the high court can still review
state contract law issues regardless of whether they arise in state court or
in federal court as a matter of diversity jurisdiction. The question before
the Court would be whether the contract law determination is consistent
with federal patent law under Article VI. This question could be one of
preemption or could be one of interpreting the federal statute and its
purposes in light of the state law determination. Arguably, Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Stanford v. Roche would have based Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction to hear the priority of assignment issues on Article
VI. 100 How the Supreme Court resolves the state law issue is another
matter. Preemption principles might provide some guidance but would not
be the sole basis for its decision. Justice Breyer’s dissent suggests
examining the Federal Circuit approach to priority in light of underlying
principles of commercial and patent law. 101 The outstanding point is that
my proposal would strip the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction while
allowing for Supreme Court review.
Stripping the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction by limiting its review of
state contract law issues, while still allowing these issues to be heard in
97. Id.
98. In creating the Federal Circuit effective October 1, 1982, Congress did allow sister circuits
to retain jurisdiction over patent cases before that date. See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
§ 402, 403(e), 96 Stat. 57, 58.
99. “Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute
confers.” Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448 (1850).
100. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S.
776 (2011).
101. Id. at 794, (Breyer S., dissenting).
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federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and preserving the
opportunity for Supreme Court review, might seem byzantine. But this
intricacy reflects the unique position of the Federal Circuit as a specialized
intermediate court of appeals. In this special role, the Federal Circuit can
exercise its expertise in patent law. But this special role currently allows
the Federal Circuit to extend its jurisdiction to areas outside its expertise
such as copyright law or contract law. Furthermore, this extension of
jurisdiction creates a jurisprudential monopoly over issues that are critical
for commercial transactions but in which patents play only a small part.
Limiting Federal Circuit jurisdiction serves to remove this bottleneck in
the development of law, given the prevalence of patents in all areas of
technology and many areas of contract.
Some may argue that my characterization of the Federal Circuit as a
jurisprudential monopolist undermines the value of uniformity in patent
law. Others may go further and say jurisdiction stripping would weaken
the patent incentives for invention and innovation. However, the Federal
Circuit is not a monopolist, and unification speaks to the authority of the
Federal Circuit in guiding patent law. This authority underwrites the
patent system and its incentives to inventors. Of course, I do not seek to
strip the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction over patent law. Rather, the goal
of jurisdiction stripping is to limit the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to its
designated area of expertise—patent law—and exclude from its
jurisdiction matters of contract law. Such a limitation can only strengthen
the Federal Circuit’s credibility and authority. Furthermore, jurisdiction
stripping ensures that contract law issues are decided pursuant to state law,
which is predictable, rather than the vagaries of federal common law. This
can only reinforce the goals of commercializing patents.
Stanford’s epic loss in Roche provides one illustration. Like other
universities and corporate entities, Stanford’s assignment policies were
crafted on an understanding of priority of assignment that the Federal
Circuit’s hereby rule undermined. Although assignees can respond to this
new rule, as many have, it would be unwise to ignore how the Federal
Circuit’s federal common law of assignment priority undermined
commercial expectations in the name of patent uniformity. Similarly, with
respect to the on-sale bar issue, the Federal Circuit has addressed the
question of what constitutes a commercial offer for sale in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff v. Wells. 102 The Federal Circuit’s
creation of a multi-factor test in Pfaff to determine when an invention is
on sale ignores state law of contract, which could potentially undermine
102.
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commercial expectations. State contract law should be developed through
state courts even if incorporated into federal questions.
For these reasons, the value of uniformity should be weighed against
other values such as the transactional role of patents and the negotiations
among patent owners, purchasers, and licensees. Jurisdiction stripping is
one way to promote recognition of these other values by incorporating
state law into patent disputes. Balancing patent rights with commercial
negotiations will likely lead to the proper alignment of patent law and
contract law. Through jurisdiction stripping, questions of contract law do
not become subsumed under patent law. But as mentioned above and
discussed in more detail below, Congress could amend patent law to more
effectively address contract law within the patent statute. As it has done
in other areas such as securities and antitrust laws, Congress could
federalize contract law and direct inferior courts on how to implement and
develop the federal standard. Perhaps direct amendment of the statute is
more desirable and effective than jurisdiction stripping. More importantly,
congressional amendment of substantive law is the product of democratic
deliberation on the role of patents in commercial transactions. Jurisdiction
stripping is an indirect procedural means to that same substantive end.
However Congress acts, aligning patent and contract law will
promote respect for vertical separation of powers between state and
federal governments. 103 As more commercial transactions involve patents,
the Federal Circuit has greater opportunity to review transactions
governed by state law. Although it is unlikely that all of commercial law
would fall under Federal Circuit jurisdiction, expanded federal review
could upset the balance between federal and state law that has emerged
over the past two centuries. Through competition among state courts and
the projects for uniform state laws, commercial law has evolved in a
direction that has shaped the expectations of parties. As parties
increasingly negotiate over technology, there is a need to consider both
federal patent law and state commercial law. A federal common law of
contracts shifts these expectations without the benefit of democratic
deliberation. Contracting parties did not expect that the Federal Circuit
would reshape their expectations. Congressional action, such as
jurisdiction stripping, can realign the balance between federal and state
courts.
One alternative to jurisdiction stripping is for Congress to directly
amend the Patent Act to address contract issues. Congress has the power

103. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007).
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to enact such amendments under either its Article I Section 8 Clause 8 or
Clause 5 powers. Such a legislative pronouncement has the potential to
more effectively direct the courts on how to handle patent-based contract
issues. This alternative provides a comparison for assessing jurisdiction
stripping. Arguably, amending the Patent Act could be a more politically
palpable option than jurisdiction stripping and could serve as a more direct
means of shaping the substantive law.
In conclusion, Congress may be more effective than the Supreme
Court in stripping the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction. While the Court
can act only by resolving cases before it, Congress can adopt a broader
perspective. But Congress can also act through altering substantive patent
law directly. Regardless of whether substantive law is altered through
judicial process or congressional amendments to the Patent Act, we must
confront the authority of the Federal Circuit. Failing to do so, I conclude,
is the least desirable option given the stakes for commercial transactions
involving patents.
V. CONCLUSION
Creating procedural hurdles to raise the costs of pursuing legal
claims can calibrate substantive law. Procedural rules are a policy lever.
While procedural rules such as pleading requirements and statutes of
limitation can guide the courts in assessing substantive claims, jurisdiction
stripping is a draconian means of controlling courts through legislation.
The jurisdiction-stripping strategy is often the subject of theoretical
discussion rather than actual implementation. Nonetheless, the strategy is
used occasionally, as we have seen in the context of habeas corpus and
access to courts in the war against terror and the management of wartime
claims. Furthermore, jurisdiction stripping provides a valuable thought
experiment for assessing substantive issues of law, as we see in the
Federal Circuit’s management of contract law issues that arise within
patent disputes.
This article is intended to guide a reformation of patent law and the
role of the Federal Circuit. These ends, however, may be best met through
reformation of the Patent Act itself rather than through its jurisdictional
arms. As a thought experiment, jurisdiction stripping highlights where the
source of the contention lies. Substantive legal reform can, as a result,
address the source of the problem. Needless to say, the current Congress
may be difficult to persuade on legal reform unless the change restores an
imaginative order of private patent rights. At a minimum, jurisdiction
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stripping as a thought experiment reminds us that the Federal Circuit is a
specialized court, as Congress intended and as Congress can shape.
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